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Abstract—Given the wide use of child care subsidies across countries, it
is surprising how little we know about the effect of these subsidies on
children’s longer-run outcomes. Using a sharp discontinuity in the price
of child care in Norway, we are able to isolate the effects of child care
subsidies on both parental and student outcomes. We find very small and
statistically insignificant effects of child care subsidies on child care utili-
zation and parental labor force participation. Despite this, we find signifi-
cant positive effect of the subsidies on children’s academic performance
in junior high school, suggesting that the positive shock to disposable
income provided by the subsidies may be helping to improve children’s
scholastic aptitude.
I. Introduction
MANY countries have implemented child care subsidiesin an effort to help families. In the United States, the
government created the Child Care and Development Fund
in 1996, which provides public funds for child care assistance
to low-income families. Despite the importance of the issue,
little is known about the effect of child care subsidies on par-
ent and child outcomes. Research in this area has been lim-
ited because of the difficulty identifying the causal effect of
child care price on later outcomes; for example, higher child
care prices may be associated with better child care or weal-
thier parents, in which case one cannot isolate the effect of
price alone on later child outcomes. This paper uses recent
data and a novel source of identifying variation—sharp dis-
continuities in the price of child care by income in Norway—
to identify the effect of child care subsidies on parental beha-
vior and the later academic achievement of children.
A number of papers have examined the effect of child
care subsidies on female labor force participation, with the
findings ranging from no effect to significant negative
effects (see Blau, 2000, for a summary). More recently,
Herbst and Tekin (2010b) examined the effect of child care
subsidies in the United States on children’s academic perfor-
mance.1 They use a unique identification strategy, applying
distance to the nearest social service agency that administers
the subsidy application process as an instrument for subsidy
receipt. They find small negative effects of subsidy receipt
the year before kindergarten on kindergarten performance,
although these negative effects have generally disappeared
by third grade.2 Our work complements this existing litera-
ture, using a different (and arguably more exogenous)
source of variation on a different population.
We find a significant positive effect of child care subsi-
dies at age 5 on children’s junior high school academic per-
formance. Being eligible for lower child care prices at age 5
increases the grade point average and the grade on an oral
exam by around 0.10 to 0.30 of a standard deviation. Given
that take-up of child care is about 55% to 60% for the sam-
ple around the discontinuity, this suggests an effect of about
20% to 50% of a standard deviation for those who receive
the child care subsidy.
Given this finding, we next investigate the mechanisms
through which it is working. A child care price subsidy may
have a number of effects on the family. First, it may increase
the attendance at formal child care relative to less expensive
and often lower-quality informal child care. A lower child
care price could also reduce parental care (instead of infor-
mal care) and potentially increase parental labor supply.
Alternatively, a subsidy could serve as a pure income trans-
fer if demand for day care is inelastic. For any given gross
income, families paying a lower price will have more dispo-
sable income than families paying the higher price.
While we find large effects on student performance, we find
no effect of these substantial child care subsidies on the utiliza-
tion of formal child care. This is consistent with a situation of
excess demand for day care; it is not the price that is important
but the availability of a spot.3 Also, as we describe later, par-
ents are not informed about the income cutoffs that determine
the child care price unless their application for a child care
place has been successful. As a result, the child care subsidy in
Norway appears to have acted as a positive shock to disposable
income in the family and, through this mechanism, improved
child outcomes. We estimate the effect on disposable income
at age 5 to be around 8% of yearly gross income for the
families situated around the discontinuity. Given that we find
significant effects on later academic performance, this sug-
gests that early investments that increase disposable income
may have long-lasting effects.4 Interestingly, and consistent
with a disposable income explanation, we also find effects of
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1 Also see Tekin (2005), Tekin (2007), and Blau and Tekin (2007).
2 There is also a substantial literature looking at the effects of programs
providing universal child care. Herbst and Tekin (2010a) and Magnuson,
Ruhm, and Waldfogel (2007) find negative effects of universal child care
programs on children’s performance, while Berlinski, Galiani, and Mana-
corda (2009), Berlinski, Galiani, and Gertler (2009), Fitzpatrick (2010),
and Havnes and Mogstad (2010, 2011) find positive effects.
3 Survey results strongly suggest that this was the case in Norway in the
1990s (Blix & Gulbrandsen, 2002).
4 This relates to a large recent literature that argues that early invest-
ment in human capital matters (see Carneiro & Heckman, 2003, and Cur-
rie, 2009, for overviews).
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Given this mechanism, our research also contributes to a
growing literature on the effect of family income on child
outcomes. The results in this literature are mixed. Using a
variety of identification strategies, Oreopoulos, Page, and
Stevens (2008), Dahl and Lochner (2012), and Milligan and
Stabile (2007) find positive effects of family income on
child outcomes, especially for poor families. This is sup-
ported by work by Duncan et al. (1998) and Levy and Dun-
can (2000), who apply family fixed-effects methods. How-
ever, Shea (2000) and Løken (2010), using instrumental
variables, and Blau (1999) and Dooley and Stewart (2004),
using fixed effects, find no or very small effects. Differ-
ences could be due to different identification strategies, data
sources, countries, and institutional settings.5
This paper advances our understanding along two dimen-
sions. First, we are able to convincingly separate income effects
from labor force participation; most of the identification strate-
gies used in the existing literature are likely reflecting both
family income changes and labor market participation (and, for
young children, child care) responses. In our paper, given that
we find no effect on labor force participation or child care utili-
zation in the short run, we are able to isolate what appears to be
an income effect.6 Second, given the recent literature suggest-
ing the importance of investments early in a child’s life (see
Carneiro & Heckman, 2003, and Currie, 2009, for overviews),
we are able to analyze the effects of shocks to income, through
child care subsidies, when children are age 5, which is likely to
be a critical period for human capital investment.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section II gives the institu-
tional background, while section III presents the empirical strat-
egy. Section IV describes the data, and sections V and VI pre-
sent results and robustness tests. Finally, section VII concludes.
II. Institutional Background
Although the history of day care in Norway goes back a
hundred years and the first law regulating day care was in
1953, there was almost no formal child care for children
below age 7 (the school starting age, which was changed to
6 in 1997) in Norway until the mid-1970s.7 However, by
the 1990s, the period we study, day care center coverage
had risen to 60% among 3- to 5-year-olds and continued to
increase throughout the period of study.8
There are two types of child care centers in Norway: pub-
lic (municipality level) and private. In the early 1990s,
approximately 60% of the day care centers were public. The
private centers were typically owned by nonprofit organiza-
tions like churches and cooperatives. However, both types
of day care centers are very similar in the way they operate.
Around 40% of public day care costs are directly subsidized
by the central government; up to one-third is from the muni-
cipality, and the rest is paid as fees by the parents. Most of
the municipalities also subsidize private day care centers,
but the subsidy may be lower than one-third of the cost.
Given the stringent national standards for child care, there is
likely little variation in quality across private and public
centers.9 For both private and public centers, the municipal-
ity pays the difference between a full fee and a reduced fee
(the discontinuity we study); the day care centers are just
subsidized more in cases with a reduced fee.10 Means-tested
day care subsidies are decided at the municipality level.
There was a tremendous expansion in female labor force
participation from the mid-1970s in Norway, creating
excess demand for day care and leading to rationing of
access to day care centers. The allocation rules determining
who got access are not transparent; however, it is clear that
children with special needs had priority, along with the chil-
dren of single mothers (constituting 7% to 8% of children
born) (OECD, 2009). Parents submitted a ranking of their
preferred day care facilities to a central office in the munici-
pality. This municipality-level institution alone allocated
children based on a variety of criteria; however, tenure in
line was the most important. This rule was applied to both
privately owned and public day care centers (since both the
state and the municipality provided subsidies).
Once the child is offered a place in child care, the family
is then informed that they can apply for the subsidy if they
have family income below a certain level specified in the
letter. While the subsidy application is now online, eligible
5 Dahl and Lochner (2012) argue that fixed effects (FE) estimators do
not control for endogenous transitory shocks not directly related to family
income and suffer from greater attenuation bias than OLS and instrumen-
tal variables (IV), because family income is measured in differences
rather than levels. Løken, Mogstad, and Wiswall (2012) argue that differ-
ing estimates might be due to the use of linear FE and IV estimators. The-
ory suggests an increasing concave relationship between family income
and child outcomes (Becker & Tomes, 1979), and different instruments
might then capture different parts of the income distribution and therefore
produce different effects.
6 Unfortunately we do not have good data on hours of work. Since we
are able to rule out effects in participation and changes in use of formal
child care, it is unlikely that hours of work change due to the subsidy.
7 At that time, a new law was passed that aimed at a large expansion in
child care as a response to the increasing labor force participation of
women. The reform included subsidies to the municipalities that created
incentives for municipalities to expand the sector through own establish-
ments or providing subsidies to private nonprofit organizations (see Havnes
& Mogstad, 2011). Although this reform increased the coverage, it was still
only 32% in 1980 among 3- to 5-year-olds and 7% among 1- to 2-year-olds.
8 There was also growth in the day care center coverage for 1- to 2-
year-olds but at a much lower level—between 15% and 30%.
9 The Day Care Act (Barnehageloven) gives nationwide standards along
several dimensions for day care centers. There are national requirements
concerning the education of the staff. For instance, the laws require that
the manager and the pedagogical leader both have a college education
(three years), very similar to the education requirements for teachers.
There are also strict requirements when it comes to playgrounds, play-
ground facilities, and total area within the center. The curriculum is cen-
trally determined, with a strong focus on learning through social relation-
ships both with other children and with adults in the day care centers
(OECD, 1999; Framework Plan (‘‘Rammeplanen’’)).
10 Although there are centrally described guidelines for staffing require-
ments, playground requirements, and so on, there is still some room for
discretion on the part of the municipalities. For instance, it is the munici-
pality that assesses the quality of the day care facilities. As a result, there
may be differences in the quality of day care centers across municipali-
ties. A recent survey found that the share of formally qualified teachers in
day care centers varied both across and within municipalities (Gul-
brandsen & Winsvold, 2009). However, they did not report any differ-
ences across private and public centers.
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families in the 1990s, went to the municipality office to fill
out the application and document their income. If their
income was below the cutoff, they received the subsidy.
The relevant income measure is household income, which
includes the income of the mother and, if applicable, her
spouse or cohabiter.
The alternative to a formal day care center was the infor-
mal sector.11 This could be play parks, groups run by nan-
nies, or grandparents, other relatives, or friends. None of
these informal arrangements received any subsidy from the
municipality. They were also not subject to the same regu-
lation by the municipality.12
Mainly due to the availability of data, we focus on child
care subsidies at age 5.13 However, given that we focus on
age 5, the institutional setting suggests that the price sub-
sidy at age 5 will work as a disposable income effect. Most
children in our sample started child care before age 5; based
on our own calculations, we find that 86% of those who
attended child care at age 5 also attended formal child care
at age 4. In addition, given the situation of excess demand,
child care decisions were likely determined prior to the
granting of the subsidy.
Table 1 shows information from a survey on the use of
registered nannies and formal day care centers in the 1990s,
in addition to labor supply of mothers.14 We see that the
labor supply of mothers with 3- to 5-year-old children
matches very well the total use of formal care—either regis-
tered nannies or day care.
III. Empirical Strategy
The day care system in Norway is run at the municipality
level (there are 435 municipalities), and the cost is heavily
subsidized for all. Parents pay about 30% of the actual costs
on average. Some municipalities have a single price that is
the same for all income groups, while others have multiple
prices that depend on family income. In these municipali-
ties, pricing takes the form of a step function, with jumps in
the price occurring at one or more levels of family income.
These jumps suggest discontinuities in the relationship
between family income and the price of child care. Assum-
ing that other factors related to family income that affect
child outcomes do not systematically change at the disconti-
nuity points, we can identify child care subsidy effects by
comparing later outcomes of children whose family income
was just less than a cutoff to those of children whose family
income was just above a cutoff. In this paper, we focus on
the first income cutoff in each municipality because in
municipalities with more than one income cutoff, the price
differences at higher cutoffs are typically small.
We use a regression discontinuity (RD) approach to esti-
mate the effect of eligibility for lower child care prices. We
have a sharp design since eligibility for cheaper child care
jumps from 0 to 1 at the discontinuity. However, the take-
up rates of child care and the subsidy are below 100%, and
we have to take this into account when interpreting the esti-
mates. For family i, in municipality m, at time t, the eligibil-
ity for lower child care price (Ei;m;t) is a deterministic func-
tion of family income the year before (FIi;m;t1); if income
was below a particular cutoff (cm;t), the family received the
extra subsidy and thereby paid a lower price. We can then
estimate the effect of being eligible for a lower child care
price on child outcomes (y) by comparing families with
incomes just below and above cm;t.
Because the level of the cutoff varies by municipality
and year, in our analysis, we normalize family income by
dividing it by the relevant cutoff income level in the muni-
cipality and subtracting 1:
Ii;m;t1 ¼ ðFIi;m;t1=cm;tÞ  1:
By construction, normalized family income (Ii;m;t1)
equals 0 at the cutoff and takes on positive (negative)
values above (below) the cutoff.15
For identification, we need to assume that income and
other characteristics about the family vary continuously
through the cutoff point; we verify this by comparing char-
acteristics on either side of the cutoff. We then estimate the
effect of the child care subsidy by taking the difference of
the boundary points of two regression functions of y on I,
one for eligible families and one for ineligible families.
We estimate different versions of the following equation:
yi;m;t ¼ b0 þ b1Ei;m;t þ b2 fl Ii;m;t1
 
þ b3 fr Ii;m;t1
 
þ b4xi þ kmt þ ei;m;t;
ð1Þ
TABLE 1.—USE OF DAY CARE AND MOTHER’S LABOR SUPPLY, 3- TO 5-YEAR-OLD
CHILDREN, 1992 AND 1998
Year 1992 1998
Nannies (%) 13 8
Nannies and day care (%) 64 77
Mothers work full time (%) 32 38
Mother works part time (%) 35 41
Mother work total (%) 66 79
Source: Report from the research institute of NOVA by Gulbrandsen and Winsvold (2009).
11 It was not until 2008 that Norway, through a change in the law,
required municipalities to have full formal child care coverage. A law
from 1998 (the so-called cash-for-care reform) gave parents the right to
the state subsidy if they opted out of day care and stayed home with the
child instead (see Schøne, 2004).
12 This was true for registered nannies (who paid income taxes) as well.
13 We have more observations for these cohorts as our data on income
cutoffs and prices start in 1991, and the last cohort with observations on
educational outcomes is 1992, giving us, for example, only three cohorts
of 1-year-olds (1990–1992), while we have seven cohorts of 5-year-olds
(1986–1992). As we rely on a regression discontinuity (RD) design for
identification, we need a large sample size to get enough observations
around the discontinuity. So while we would ideally like to study the
effect of total child care use during childhood, we can study child care
use only at age 5.
14 See the report from the research institute of NOVA by Gulbrandsen
and Winsvold (2009).
15 We have also tried normalizing income by subtracting the cutoff
level of income in the municipality, and this leads to similar results.
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where i denotes individual, m denotes municipality, and t
denotes year. Here Ei;m;t ¼ 1fIi;m;t1 < 0g, an indicator for
whether family income is below the cutoff; x is a vector of
individual and family control variables, and k is a vector of
cohort by municipality fixed effects. We want to estimate
b1, the effect of being eligible for lower child care prices on
children’s outcomes. While the presence or absence of con-
trols should not have much impact on estimates in a regres-
sion discontinuity design, we control for pre–child care par-
ental characteristics in order to increase the precision of our
estimates.16
Because all our outcomes will typically vary with family
income and eligibility for cheaper child care depends on
income, we have to control for family income on each side
of the discontinuity in a flexible way. The functions fl and fr
allow the effect of income to differ between the left and
right sides of the cutoff. We estimate equation (1) for sev-
eral bandwidths and estimate specifications using linear,
quadratic, cubic, and quartic functions of income. When we
use linear functions of income, our method is equivalent to
local linear regression (LLR), as in Fan (1992), Hahn,
Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001), and Porter (2003), using
a rectangular kernel.17 With this approach, control variables
can naturally be added to the specification.
We present our results both graphically and in tables.
The figures illustrate the local linear specification with rec-
tangular kernel and bandwidth of .1. We also show the 95%
confidence intervals and scatter plots with average out-
comes for twenty income bins. Note that this is only to
illustrate the pattern in the data; the estimation uses all the
observations to estimate the discontinuity. In the tables we
also present results with bandwidths ranging from .02 to .5
and income polynomials varying from 0 (no income con-
trols) to 4 (a quartic in income) and we allow these func-
tions to vary on each side of the discontinuity.18
IV. Data
We use administrative data covering the entire popula-
tion of Norway. The analysis includes birth cohorts from
1986 to 1992 and links individuals to their parents through
unique identifiers. We have information on parental charac-
teristics such as parental age, educational attainment when
the child was born, income, marital status, and citizenship.
For children, we have grade point average and exam grades
from junior high school. In addition, we match parents to
their tax records, where we are able to observe whether par-
ents take deductions for child care expenses; this allows us
to identify whether a child attends formal child care.
Finally, we have collected data from municipalities in Nor-
way on child care prices and family income cutoffs in the
1990s.
Family income is created by adding mother’s earnings to
those of any spouse or cohabiter. Earnings are measured as
total pension-qualifying earnings reported in the tax regis-
try, starting from 1967. The earnings measure includes
labor earnings and all taxable welfare benefits, including
sick benefits, unemployment benefits, and parental leave
payments. This is the same income measure that municipa-
lities use to determine whether families are eligible for
cheaper child care.19 Our measure of disposable income is
defined as family income minus the child care price faced
by the family.
Our measure of child care attendance is created from the
information on tax deductions for child care expenses from
parents’ tax records; these are available from 1993.20 The
child care tax deduction was introduced in 1948; parents
are allowed to deduct up to NOK 25,000 (USD $4,310)
from taxes in one calendar year for the first child for formal
child care that takes place outside the home.21 As a result,
our definition of child care excludes home care and infor-
mal care by grandparents and nannies. There is a significant
amount of variation in tax deductions across families due to
both different costs across municipalities and different
prices across income groups within municipalities. Our
measure of child care is an indicator for whether or not the
child is attending formal child care. The online data appen-
dix and appendix table 1 contain details of exactly how
child care use is inferred from the tax data.
Finally, we have collected data at the municipality level
on the price system and actual prices of child care in the
1990s. If the municipality had variable prices across the
income distribution, we asked explicitly for the income cut-
offs that the municipality used to determine eligibility for
cheaper child care. We received information from 69% of
the municipalities, including the ten largest. This gives us
information on the price system for about 85% of the total
sample. Figure 1 provides a map of Norwegian municipali-
ties showing that variable, flat, and unknown price munici-
palities are scattered across Norway.
16 Control variables are parental age, parental citizenship, parental edu-
cation when child is born, marital status when child is born, student and
welfare recipient status of mother when child is age 4, and family income
prior to age 4 (measured as the average income when the child was aged
1 to 3).
17 Lee and Lemieux (2009) recommend doing local linear regression
using one kernel and focus on estimating the model with different band-
widths. We have also tried local linear regressions with different kernels,
without any significant changes to the main results.
18 We calculate heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (White, 1980)
following suggestions by Lee and Lemieux (2009).
19 Almost all municipalities use the previous year’s tax sheet to deter-
mine subsidy eligibility. As a robustness check, we have run the regres-
sions for municipalities where we are certain that they used last year’s tax
sheet and find similar results (results available on request). For identifica-
tion, it is also an advantage to use the previous year’s income because
parents cannot manipulate the previous year’s income based on today’s
cutoff.
20 This means that we do not have information on child care attendance
for our first two cohorts born in 1986 and 1987.
21 The extra deduction for the second child is NOK 5,000, for a total of
NOK 30,000. The annual price of child care is almost always below NOK
25,000 per child, at least for the families we study around the discontinu-
ity.
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There are some missing observations in the data. We
exclude the observations where parental background char-
acteristics are missing. This reduces our sample from
448,198 observations to 367,836. We have tested that the
main results on child outcomes are not sensitive to exclud-
ing these observations.
Our analysis is conducted on families located around the
first price discontinuity in each municipality. We include
families with income no more than 50% below or above the
discontinuity—that is, with normalized income between
0.5 and þ0.5.22 While our maximum bandwidth is .5, we
report estimates for a range of smaller bandwidths, with the
smallest being .02.23
For children, we have information on performance on
junior high school national exams and their grade point
average (GPA) in tenth grade.24 The grade point average is
an average of the tenth grader’s performance in all twelve
graduating subjects.25 The exam data are the grades from
written and oral exams that are administered in the final
year of junior high school at the national level and are
externally graded. The written exam could be in math, Nor-
wegian, or English, and the subject is randomly assigned at
the school level.26 The students are informed about which
exams they will take a couple of days before the exam date.
The oral exam can be in any of the twelve subjects taught
in the last year of middle school, and the students are ran-
domly allocated to subjects. These grades are important for
high school admission. The grades range from 1 to 6.27
Table 2, column 1 gives descriptive statistics for the total
sample of children born between 1986 and 1992. Column 2
provides descriptive statistics for our analysis sample (those
within .5 of the cutoff), and column 3 describes those who
are within our preferred bandwidth of .1. We see that the
samples are very similar in terms of child characteristics
such as age, gender, number of siblings, and birth order.
However, in the .5 and .1 samples, parents tend to have
fewer years of education and are more likely to be of non-
Norwegian citizenship, highlighting the fact that these sam-
ples are composed of individuals at the bottom end of the
income distribution. About 80% of the total sample is mar-
ried or officially cohabiting in the year of their child’s birth;
this number is 72% for both the .5 and .1 samples. When
comparing school performance of the total sample with our
analysis samples, we see that children in the analysis sam-
ples tend to perform worse, with a mean GPA of 4 and 3.7,
respectively.28 This is not surprising as we know that chil-
dren from low-income families tend to perform worse in
school.
V. Results
A. Testing for Income Manipulation
Based on communications with the municipalities, we
have verified that the cutoffs for the child care subsidy are
not also used to determine eligibility for other social pro-
grams. Therefore, we are not worried that our discontinuity
design could be picking up the effects of other welfare pro-
grams in addition to child care. The major remaining poten-
tial threat to the design is the possibility that families
manipulate their income so as to locate strategically around





22 For example, if the price discontinuity is NOK 100,000, we include
families with income between NOK 50,000 and NOK 150,000. The
results are robust to including more families; however, as the discontinu-
ity is at low levels of income, we cannot move much further to the left of
the discontinuity as zero income is binding from below.
23 We have experimented with excluding families where mothers are
students when the child is age 4. This is because students might have dif-
ferent rules for child care and might not be affected by the subsidies.
Excluding students (about 5% of sample) does not change the results. We
have also experimented with excluding mothers who receive social secur-
ity benefits, and this also does not change any of the main results.
24 In Norway junior high school children are ages 13 to 16.
25 These consist of written and oral Norwegian, written and oral Eng-
lish, mathematics, nature and science, social science, religion, home eco-
nomics, physical education, music, and handcrafts.
26 Because we control for cohort by municipality fixed effects, differ-
ences in grading standards across cohorts or municipalities will not lead
to bias. In this exercise, we control for municipality by cohort fixed
effects.
27 There are advantages and disadvantages with different measures. The
exam grades are more variable because they are a one-time measure of
skills. However, they are more comparable across cohorts and schools
because they are graded externally. The grade point average is generally a
better measure of long-term skills as it covers all subjects and averages
over all grades; however, it is also more subjective because it depends on
teacher assessments. However, our identification strategy compares simi-
lar families just below and above the income cutoff who will, on average,
have the same schooling environment, so all three measures of academic
performance should be valid.
28 A more detailed distribution of grades for the grade point average
and the written and oral exams is shown in appendix table 2.
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the income cutoffs (Lee & Lemieux, 2009).29 There are
several reasons that we think this is not a factor in this case.
The first reason we think it is unlikely that individuals
have strategically manipulated their income is that the cut-
off is based on the previous year’s income but is unknown
the year before the child care subsidy is allocated; as a
result, families cannot perfectly predict where the cutoff
will be and adjust their income accordingly. However, a
concern is that in some cases, the cutoff may be predictable.
For example, of the 72 municipalities, 30 did not change
cutoffs in our sample period, so the cutoff is easy to predict.
The remaining 42 municipalities do change cutoffs, and we
have verified that none do so in an easily predictable fash-
ion. For example, none of them increases the cutoff by the
same percentage each year. Later (in table 6), we show that
our estimates are robust to restricting the sample to only
municipalities with large changes in cutoffs over time.
A second reason to think there is no income manipulation
is the smooth distribution of income around the cutoff. If
there were income manipulation, it should show itself in a
spike in the income distribution just below the cutoff. In
appendix figure 1, we show the density of normalized
family income for the analysis sample. We see that there is
no evidence of income clustering below the cutoff.
Another concern would be that although there is no evi-
dence of a discontinuity in income around the cutoff, there
could be unobserved differences between people on oppo-
site sides of the discontinuity. This implication is inherently
untestable, but we can examine observed family character-
istics. We compare presubsidy characteristics for families
on opposite sides of the discontinuity to verify that observa-
ble characteristics do not change at the discontinuity. These
results are presented in appendix table 3. We show esti-
TABLE 2.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Samples Total Sample 0.5 Sample 0.1 Sample
Age in 2006 18.9 19.1 19.1
(2.0) (2.0) (2.0)
[367,836] [10,770] [1,946]
Female .49 .49 .48
(.50) (.50) (.50)
[367,836] [10,770] [1,946]
Number of siblings 1.8 1.9 2.0
(1.1) (1.4) (1.4)
[367,836] [10,770] [1,946]
Birth order 1.9 1.9 1.8
(1.0) (1.1) (1.1)
[367,836] [10,770] [1,946]
Mother’s education at birth of child 11.9 10.2 10.1
(3.4) (4.3) (4.3)
[367,836] [10,770] [1,946]
Father’s education at birth of child 11.8 9.8 9.8
(3.5) (4.4) (4.4)
[367,836] [10,770] [1,946]
Mother’s age at birth of child 27.9 26.1 26.1
(5.0) (5.4) (5.5)
[367,836] [10,770] [1,946]
Father’s age at birth of child 30.7 29.3 29.3
(5.6) (6.4) (6.4)
[367,836] [10,770] [1,946]
Mother non-Norwegian citizen at birth of child .05 .17 .17
(.21) (.38) (.38)
[367,836] [10,770] [1,946]
Father non-Norwegian citizen at birth of child .05 .18 .19
(.21) (.39) (.39)
[367,836] [10,770] [1,946]
Married/cohabiting at birth of child .8 .72 .72
(.40) (.45) (.45)
[367,836] [10,770] [1,946]
Grade point average (scale: 1–6) 4.0 3.7 3.7
(.82) (.85) (.86)
[359,339] [10,238] [1,835]
Grade written exam (scale: 1–6) 3.5 3.1 3.1
(1.1) (1.1) (1.1)
[344,271] [9,572] [1,708]
Grade oral exam (scale: 1–6) 4.3 3.9 4.0
(1.2) (1.2) (1.2)
[318,783] [8,823] [1,578]
29 An alternative possibility is that even without manipulation, families
below the threshold might just happen by chance to have better unob-
served characteristics. The balancing tests we describe below suggest that
this is unlikely to be an issue in our case.
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mates for three bandwidths (.1, .25, and .5), and for both
the linear and quadratic models.30 This table shows the
results for balancing tests on parents’ educational attain-
ment, age at birth, citizenship and marital status in the birth
year of the child, mother’s welfare status when child is age
4, and average family income when child is age 0 to 3. The
estimates are all statistically insignificant at the 5% level
apart from three exceptions: one specification in which
mother’s education is significantly higher to the left of the
discontinuity, one specification in which parents are less
likely to be married, and one specification in which the
mother is more likely to have been on welfare. Overall,
there is little compelling evidence here for differences in
observables around the discontinuity. Appendix figure 2
shows this graphically for several of these outcomes using
the linear model with a bandwidth of .1 along with the asso-
ciated 95% confidence intervals.31
In the last three rows of appendix table 3, we explore this
issue further by considering the predicted student perfor-
mance based on observable student and parent characteris-
tics and comparing this measure for students on either side
of the discontinuity. To do so, we regress each of our child
outcome variables (GPA, written exam score, and oral
exam score) on the parental background variables and gen-
erate a predicted GPA, predicted written exam, and pre-
dicted oral exam for each child. These new variables repre-
sent what we would predict the child outcomes to be based
solely on their family background. We carry out the balan-
cing tests with these as dependent variables. Reassuringly,
the estimates are very small in all specifications and pre-
cisely enough estimated to rule out large effects. This pro-
vides support for the assumption that children’s outcomes
are most likely being affected only by the child care subsidy
itself, and not other differences.
Finally, by using the regression discontinuity approach,
we are implicitly assuming that the assignment of subsidy
receipt is essentially random, conditional on observables. As
a result, it should be the case that the probability of subsidy
receipt prior to age 5 is equal for both the treatment and con-
trol groups. Appendix table 4 presents estimates of the prob-
ability of being below the cutoff when the child was aged 1
to 4. Importantly, we see no effect of current subsidy receipt
on the probability of being below the cutoff at ages prior to
the subsidy (one coefficient out of 24 is statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level). This further supports our assumption
that there is no strategic income manipulation.
B. Children’s Outcomes
Tables 3 to 5 present the effect of child care subsidies on
children’s GPA and exam grades in junior high school.
When analyzing these outcomes, we standardize them to
have mean 0 and standard deviation of 1 so that the coeffi-
cients are comparable across regressions. We show estimates
for five bandwidths (.02, .05, .1, .25, and .5) and five differ-
ent specifications (zero to four polynomials). We also indi-
cate the optimal order of the polynomial as determined by
the Akaike criterion (penalized cross-validation). Not sur-
prisingly, the standard errors are very high for the .02 and .05
bandwidths, so we do not emphasize these results. Instead,
we focus on estimates from the .1, .25, and .5 bandwidths as
they tend to provide reasonably precise estimates.32
TABLE 3.—EFFECT OF BEING BELOW THE INCOME CUTOFF ON THE GRADE POINT AVERAGE
Bandwidth/ Polynomial of Order 0.02 0.05 .10 .25 .5
0 .209 .091 .042 .043 .019
(.156) (.082) (.054) (.031) (.022)
[.994] [.254] [.330] [.728] [.898]
1 .207 .499* .266* .114 .066
(.329) (.167) (.109) (.062) (.042)
[.994] [.787] [.590] [.708] [.924]
2 .025 .306 .390* .211* .070
(.436) (.235) (.162) (.094) (.064)
[.982] [.782] [.680] [.863] [.898]
3 .151 .400 .439* .328* .159
(.565) (.307) (.214) (.126) (.085)
[.554] [.665] [.523] [.910] [.950]
4 .226 .533 .454 .513* .289*
(.762) (.369) (.258) (.158) (.107)
[.553] [.369] [.504] [.973] [.984]
Optimal order of polynomials 0 1 1 2 4
N 354 912 1,835 4,727 10,211
* p < 0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values from the goodness-of-fit test in brackets. The goodness-of-fit test is obtained by jointly testing the significance of a set of bin dummies included as additional
regressors in the model. The bin width used to construct the bin dummies is .01. The optimal order of the polynomial is chosen using Akaike’s criterion (penalized cross-validation). This table reports the coefficients
from an RD regression with income polynomials on each side of the discontinuity. Control variables are cohort  municipality fixed effects, parents’ age, education, citizenship, marital status at birth of child, pre–
child care family income, and mother’s welfare and student status when the child was age 4.
30 Because of space constraints, we exclude estimates for 0, 3, and 4
polynomials and for the very small bandwidths. These estimates also
show no evidence of better family characteristics on the left-hand side of
the discontinuity.
31 The values of the y-axis are created by always including 1 standard
deviation around the mean outcome in order to make the graphs compar-
able.
32 When we use the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) method to deter-
mine the optimal bandwidth, the suggested bandwidth is between .2 and
.3 depending on the outcomes. However, in general, lower bandwidths
imply lower bias, so we also put weight on estimates using the bandwidth
of .1.
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In table 3, we see a statistically significant positive
effect of subsidy receipt on children’s GPA that is gener-
ally between .1 and .5 of a standard deviation. The range
of estimate sizes across bandwidths and specification
implies that we cannot be certain about the exact magni-
tude. Because not everyone is in child care and hence
affected by the child care subsidy, this is an intention-to-
treat effect. Given that take-up of child care for our analy-
sis sample is about 55% to 60%, this means that the effect
for the treated is even larger. If we conservatively take an
estimate of .1 to .3 for the intention to treat, this implies
an effect on the treated of about .17 to .50 of a standard
deviation.
Table 4 has estimates for the written exam. Here there is
not much evidence for a positive effect as all estimates are
statistically insignificant except for the largest bandwidth of
.5. Even for this bandwidth, the significant effect is small at
.05, implying an effect on the treated of about .1 of a stan-
dard deviation. Results for the oral exam are in table 5.
Once again, the estimates are generally positive but statisti-
cally significant in only a few specifications. The statisti-
cally significant estimates using the optimal number of
FIGURE 2.—EFFECT OF CHILD CARE SUBSIDY ON CHILDREN’S JUNIOR HIGH ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE
(Left) The solid line is the local linear regression with a rectangular kernel and bandwidth .1. (Right) The solid line is the optimal polynomial regression from tables 3 to 5 with a window of .5 (quartic for GPA, no
polynomial for written exam, and linear for oral exam). The dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals. The scatter plot is the average standardized outcome for twenty income bins.
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polynomials for the .25. and .5 bandwidths suggest a magni-
tude size of about .1 of a standard deviation.
Figure 2 presents the results for the standardized scores
graphically. For each outcome, we show the graph for the
linear model with a bandwidth of .1 and a graph for the
optimal number of polynomials (quartic for GPA, no
income control for written, and linear for the oral exam)
using the largest bandwidth of .5. For the bandwidth of .1,
the linear model appears to fit quite well. This is unsurpris-
ing as the optimal polynomial at this bandwidth is linear for
both GPA and the oral exam. With the larger bandwidth of
.5, there is more curvature in the GPA data, and the optimal
polynomial is quartic. The right-hand panel of figure 2 sug-
gests that the quartic fits the data well. Interestingly, even
with this larger bandwidth, the optimal polynomials for the
written and oral exams are 1 and 0, respectively. The linear-
ity of the data for these outcomes is apparent in figure 2.
C. Robustness Checks
To verify our findings, we run a number of robustness
checks. A key concern is whether individuals can manipu-
late their income to be on the desirable side of the cutoff.
As noted before, this is unlikely, given that we see no
bunching at the favorable side of the income cutoff and
there is little evidence of observable differences in charac-
teristics on opposite sides of the discontinuity. As a further
check, we divide our sample into municipalities with no
changes or small changes in cutoffs over time and those
with larger changes. Presumably if individuals are manipu-
TABLE 5.—EFFECT OF BEING BELOW THE INCOME CUTOFF ON THE ORAL EXAM SCORE
Bandwidth/ Polynomial of Order 0.02 0.05 .10 .25 .5
0 .132 .117 .029 .089* .063*
(.162) (.091) (.058) (.034) (.024)
[.929] [.225] [.257] [.364] [.080]
1 .021 .377* .194 .091 .113*
(.314) (.175) (.117) (.067) (.046)
[.231] [.356] [.594] [.424] [.279]
2 .108 .329 .259 .073 .062
(.449) (.245) (.171) (.102) (.069)
[.217] [.333] [.653] [.380] [.304]
3 .612 .431 .327 .199 .117
(.586) (.314) (.225) (.135) (.092)
[.735] [.593] [.521] [.480] [.345]
4 .144 .666 .462 .421* .161
(.758) (.358) (.269) (.165) (.116)
[.736] [.619] [.601] [.619] [.343]
Optimal order of polynomials 3 3 1 0 1
N 312 793 1,578 4,401 9,546
* p < 0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values from the goodness-of-fit test in brackets. The goodness-of-fit test is obtained by jointly testing the significance of a set of bin dummies included as additional
regressors in the model. The bin width used to construct the bin dummies is .01. The optimal order of the polynomial is chosen using Akaike’s criterion (penalized cross-validation). This table reports the coefficients
from an RD regression with income polynomials on each side of the discontinuity. Control variables are cohort  municipality fixed effects, parents’ age, education, citizenship, marital status at birth of child, pre–
child care family income, and mother’s welfare, and student status when the child was age 4.
TABLE 4.—EFFECT OF BEING BELOW THE INCOME CUTOFF ON THE WRITTEN EXAM SCORE
Bandwidth/ Polynomial of order 0.02 0.05 .10 .25 .5
0 .078 .006 .013 .041 .053**
(.149) (.085) (.054) (.032) (.022)
[.617] [.627] [.637] [.910] [.683]
1 .105 .224 .165 .067 .023
(.298) (.170) (.110) (.063) (.043)
[.484] [.244] [.452] [.860] [.672]
2 .412 .052 .140 .084 .037
(.411) (.233) (.162) (.095) (.065)
[.438] [.480] [.416] [.750] [.604]
3 .238 .018 .232 .129 .064
(.501) (.306) (.215) (.127) (.087)
[.916] [.593] [.458] [.752] [.635]
4 .058 .181 .087 .237 .202*
(.707) (.348) (.258) (.157) (.108)
[.970] [.388] [.601] [.910] [.647]
Optimal order of polynomials 0 1 1 1 0
N 334 852 1,708 4,401 9,546
* p < 0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values from the goodness-of-fit test in brackets. The goodness-of-fit test is obtained by jointly testing the significance of a set of bin dummies included as additional
regressors in the model. The bin width used to construct the bin dummies is .01. The optimal order of the polynomial is chosen using Akaike’s criterion (penalized cross-validation). This table reports the coefficients
from an RD regression with income polynomials on each side of the discontinuity. Control variables are cohort  municipality fixed effects, parents’ age, education, citizenship, marital status at birth of child, pre–
child care family income, and mother’s welfare, and student status when the child was age 4.
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lating their income, the effects should be driven by the more
predictable, no- or small-change municipalities.33 The first
two columns of table 6 show that this is not the case.34
As a further check, it should be the case that municipali-
ties with smaller jumps in prices at the cutoff should also
experience smaller changes in children’s performance. As a
test, we split municipalities into those with small jumps in
price (where there is little effect on disposable income) and
those with larger jumps in price. Table 6, columns 3 and 4,
presents the results, and it is clear that the main effects
come from municipalities with the largest price cuts (also
see appendix figure 3 for the pictures for GPA). We find
essentially no effect for municipalities with small price
jumps and large, significant effects for municipalities with
larger price jumps.
Finally, when it comes to municipalities with different
cutoffs across family income, we might expect the effect to
be larger for municipalities where the cutoff is at lower
levels of family income, since this is consistent with the lit-
erature finding larger effects for the most disadvantaged
families. However, we see from table 6, columns 5 and 6,
that the effects are very similar across both types of munici-
palities. This may be because all the cutoffs are at reason-
ably low levels of income. 35
We also take advantage of the fact that some municipali-
ties have no variation in the price of child care; municipali-
ties with a flat price system do not give us variation across
family income to identify an effect of differences in child
care prices across income. However, as a placebo test, we
assign the flat price municipalities the average cutoff of the
variable price municipalities to check whether there are any
systematic differences across child outcomes for our
cohorts that are unrelated to the price discontinuity. (We
should observe no effect of this ‘‘placebo’’ discontinuity on
any outcomes.) Appendix table 5 presents these results; it is
reassuring to note that there is no effect on children’s
grades or test scores.
Finally, in appendix table 6, we present results when we
move the cutoff  5% from the true cutoff and estimate the
effects using these placebo cutoffs; again, it is reassuring to
see no effects on any of the outcomes whether we use
 5%.
D. Mechanisms
Given the observed effect of the child care subsidy on
children’s junior high school performance, the next ques-
tion becomes what factors are driving these effects. The
first part of table 7 shows the effects of the child care sub-
sidy on various intermediate outcomes, and figure 3 plots
the variables for the linear model with bandwidth of .1.
Importantly, from the first row in table 7, we see no evi-
dence of any effect of the child care subsidy on child care
utilization.36
Despite this, it is clear that the price jumps, and hence
disposable income falls, significantly at the discontinuity.
From the next row in table 7 we see that families below the
discontinuity pay, on average, almost NOK 10,000 (USD
$1,700) less for child care per year. Given that the average
value of the cutoff in our analysis samples is NOK 125,000,
this implies that families just below the cutoff have just
over 8% more yearly disposable income when the child is
in child care at age 5.














Cutoff at Low Levels
of Family Income
Municipalities with
Cutoff at Higher Levels
of Family Income
Grade point average .147 .361 .405* .034 .336* .207
(.167) (.189) (.131) (.200) (.149) (.161)
[762] [774] [1,288] [547] [909] [926]
Written exam .130 .152 .260* .047 .239 .119
(.169) (.189) (.132) (.199) (.151) (.161)
[706] [723] [1,205] [503] [858] [850]
Oral exam .177 .177 .248 .099 .275 .123
(.182) (.196) (.140) (.215) (.165) (.168)
[668] [658] [1,095] [483] [774] [804]
* p < 0.05. This table reports the coefficients from an RD regression with linear trends on each side of the discontinuity and a window/bandwidth of .1. Control variables are cohort  municipality fixed effects,
parents’ age, education, citizenship, marital status at birth of child, pre–child care family income, and mother’s welfare and student status when the child was aged 4. For the first subgroup on changes in cutoffs, small
changes in cutoffs 1993–1997 are defined as no more than a 5% increase in cutoffs in the period from 1993 to 1997, while big changes are more than 5%. The median change in cutoffs from 1993 to 1997 is 5%.
33 We classify municipalities as large-change municipalities if the aver-
age change in the cutoff in the municipality over our period exceeds the
median across municipalities. As such, this group excludes all municipali-
ties that never change cutoffs and also excludes some municipalities that
make small changes.
34 Due to space constraints, table 6 shows only estimates using the lin-
ear model with a bandwidth of .1. The findings are broadly similar using
other bandwidths and specifications.
35 To understand more about which children are most affected by the
child care subsidy, we have split the sample into subgroups based on pre–
child care characteristics (mothers having ten years of education or fewer
when the child was born compared to more than ten years, parents who
were married or cohabiting when the child was born compared to not mar-
ried or not cohabiting, and females compared to males and mothers with
and without Norwegian citizenship status when the child was born). There
is very little evidence of large differences by subgroup.
36 We do not have information on child care deductions at age 5 for all
cohorts, so we have fewer observations for this variable than for others.
For the cohorts for which we have child care information, we have tried
estimating the effect of the subsidy on academic outcomes by child care
status. Unfortunately, the estimates are not informative, with high stan-
dard errors for both groups and no significant differences.
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We next study whether the subsidy affects parental labor
supply and income. We see little evidence of effects of the
subsidy on mother’s or father’s labor supply (although the
coefficient is positive and statistically significant for women
in one specification). This suggests that there are no
responses by the parents on the extensive margin and is
consistent with no effects on child care utilization; the sub-
sidy does not appear to affect time allocation between the
FIGURE 3.—MECHANISMS
The solid line is the local linear regression with a rectangular kernel and bandwidth .1. The dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals. The scatter plot is the average standardized outcome for twenty income bins.
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labor market and care for the children. We also look at
mother’s part-time work when the child is aged 5 and see
no effect (almost no fathers work part time). When we
study mother’s and father’s income at age 5, we see no sig-
nificant effect on mother’s or father’s income.
But could one year of higher disposable income have this
large an effect on student’s performance many years later?
Given the availability of data on parental income and labor
force participation throughout the child’s school years, we
are able to see if there are longer-run effects on family
resources. Table 7 also presents the results when we exam-
ine average family income, calculated as the average from
the years when the child was between 6 and 15. Impor-
tantly, we find that the child care subsidy at age 5 appears
to have a significant and substantial positive effect on aver-
age family income. The exact magnitude differs by specifi-
cation but is generally in the region of 10%.37
In summary, we find that the child care subsidy at age 5
leads to higher disposable income at that age but also higher
family incomes at ages 6 to 15. We are not sure why it has
this effect. One possibility is that these low-income people
are liquidity constrained, and the extra disposable income
allows them to move into self-employment. For example,
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) show that windfall gains
are very important factors in enabling low-income people
to make a transition to self-employment. Another possibi-
lity is that the extra income allows them to invest in human
capital, and they receive the payoff from this in terms of
higher earnings in later years. Unfortunately, we do not
have the required data to test these hypotheses.
Assuming that the child care subsidy affects school
scores through its effects on family income, we can esti-
mate the implied effect of income on scores. Given that dis-
posable income at age 5 increases by about 8% due to the
subsidy if the child is in child care and the effect on test
scores is about 17% to 50% of a standard deviation, this
would imply that a 1% increase in family income at age 5
would increase scores by about 2% to 6% of a standard
deviation. This would be a large effect of a once-off income
shock, and it is substantially larger than the short-run effect
reported in Dahl and Lochner (2012), where an increase in
income of about 20% from a tax credit increased test scores
in math and reading test scores by about 6% of a standard
deviation. However, in our case, persons below the cutoff
also have about 10% higher family income when the child
is aged 6 to 15. So the magnitude of our effects needs to be
interpreted in the context of a permanent increase in family
income rather than that of a once-off shock to income.38
TABLE 7.—MECHANISMS: EFFECT OF BEING BELOW THE INCOME CUTOFF ON VARIOUS OUTCOMES
Polynomials 1 1 1 2 2 2
Window/Bandwidth .1 .25 .5 .1 .25 .5
Child care attendance .026 .015 .018 .032 .039 .026
(.061) (.036) (.024) (.090) (.054) (.036)
Price of child care (in NOK) 9,328* 9,596* 9,265* 8,840* 9,307* 9,426*
(374) (194) (131) (613) (313) (208)
Mother’s labor supply .013 .043 .059* .031 .033 .043
(.048) (.028) (.019) (.072) (.042) (.329)
Mother work part time .014 .008 .007 .005 .017 .006
(.040) (.023) (.015) (.062) (.035) (.023)
Ln(Mother’s income) .040 .102 .087 .201 .154 .095
(.129) (.075) (.050) (.196) (.115) (.075)
Father’s labor supply .026 .010 .006 .012 .013 .025
(.045) (.026) (.018) (.067) (.039) (.027)
Ln(Father’s income) .002 .032 .000 .189 .025 .076
(.099) (.059) (.040) (.152) (.089) (.061)
Ln(Annuity of family income) .183* .092* .042* .124 .138* .076*
Age 6–15 (.050) (.030) (.021) (.073) (.043) (.030)
N 1,341/1,946 3,424/4,991 7,460/10,743 1,341/1,946 3,424/4,991 7,460/10,743
/1,946/1,946 /4,991/4,991 /10,743/10,743 /1,946/1,946 /4,991/4,991 /10,743/10,743
/1,400/1,946 /3,677/4,991 /10,743/8,024 /1,400/1,946 /3,677/4,991 /10,743/8,024
/1,781/1,924 /4,574/4,932 /9,790/10,609 /1,781/1,924 /4,574/4,932 /9,790/10,609
* p < 0.05. This table reports the coefficients from an RD regression with income polynomials on each side of the discontinuity. Control variables are cohort  municipality fixed effects, parents’ age, education,
citizenship, marital status at birth of child, pre–child care family income, and mother’s welfare and student status when the child was age 4.
37 We have also examined parents’ labor force participation, calculated
as the total years of employment when the child was between the ages of
6 and 15. Importantly, we find that the child care subsidy at age 5 appears
to have a significant positive effect on father’s labor force participation.
38 We also calculated the OLS estimates from a regression of the out-
come variables on family income at age 5. To avoid using variation from
the discontinuity, we included a dummy control for whether the case was
below the discontinuity. When we used the level of family income, the esti-
mates implied that an increase in family income of NOK 10,000 (approxi-
mately the average value of being just below the cutoff), increases scores
by about .002 to .01 of a standard deviation. Using log family income, the
estimates implied that an income change of about 10% (again, approxi-
mately the difference between being above and below the cutoff) leads to a
change in grades of about .005 to .01 of a standard deviation. Thus, the
OLS income effects are much lower than our point estimates using the dis-
continuity. This is not surprising given the existing literature. Dahl and
Lochner (2012) find a similar pattern, with their IV results being larger than
their OLS. There are a number of possible explanations for this difference.
The most obvious is that the RD is estimating local average treatment
effects, and large shocks to income mean more for low-income individuals.
Another explanation may be that the one-time large income subsidy for
child care attendance has a longer-run effect on the income trajectories of
the parents beyond just the initial income shock. This explanation is consis-
tent with our findings on the mechanisms.
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An alternative is to compare the magnitudes to the effects
of early preschool intervention programs. These have often
been found to have large effects. For example, the Abece-
darian Project (IQ increases of .75 to 1.0 standard devia-
tions), the Perry Preschool project (IQ increases of .60 stan-
dard deviations), and the Tennessee class size experiment
(increased achievement by approximately .2 standard devia-
tions) (Duncan, Morris, & Rodrigues 2011).
E. Siblings
Finally, given that it seems the most likely mechanism is
disposable income during childhood, an important check of
our results would be to look at the effects of the subsidy on
the other children in the family. If the subsidy is in fact
increasing disposable income for the family, then all chil-
dren should benefit, and not just the child who generates the
subsidy. In table 8, we report effects for older siblings and
see that there are tendencies toward positive effects,
although they are more imprecisely estimated due to smal-
ler sample sizes. When we look at younger siblings, the
estimates are too imprecisely estimated to draw any conclu-
sions.
VI. Conclusion
Given the wide use of child care subsidies across coun-
tries, it is surprising how little we know about the effect of
these subsidies on children’s longer-run outcomes. Using a
sharp discontinuity in the price of child care in Norway, we
are able to isolate the effects of child care subsidies on both
parental and student outcomes. We find very small and sta-
tistically insignificant effects of child care subsidies on
child care utilization and parental labor force participation.
Despite this, we find significant positive effects of the subsi-
dies on children’s academic performance in junior high
school, suggesting that the positive shock to disposable
income provided by the subsidies may help to improve chil-
dren’s scholastic aptitude.
Policy recommendations based on the results in this
paper point toward increasing disposable income for low-
income families. Norway subsidizes child care with NOK
28 billion (USD $4.5 billion) yearly, and most of these
subsidies are universal. A move toward more income-
means-tested subsidies may be beneficial for children. Our
findings suggest that the child care subsidy in Norway for 5-
year-olds works as an in-kind transfer, providing families
with more disposable income for a period of early childhood.
It also leads to greater labor force participation in later years
and therefore a permanent positive shock to family income.
As in Norway, child care subsidies are available to cer-
tain groups in the United States (Herbst & Tekin, 2010a).
Given the low level of the income cutoffs for subsidies in
both the United States and Norway, the affected population
looks quite similar. Subsidy recipients tend to be signifi-
cantly less educated and poorer than the population as a
whole. They are substantially more likely to be a minority
in the United States and more likely to be a nonnative in
Norway. That said, the institutional environments are suffi-
ciently different that one might be reluctant to generalize
findings across these countries. These results are more
likely to translate to other countries with an extended wel-
fare state, such as the countries in Northern Europe.
We cannot rule out that subsides targeted at other ages or
in other settings might give different parental responses. A
key limitation of this paper is that although we are able to
identify a significant and positive effect of the child care
subsidy on children’s performance, we are ultimately
unable to disentangle the underlying causes of this effect.
This suggests the need for future work focusing on under-
standing these mechanisms.
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